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Groups need contributions that are personally costly to their members. Such
cooperation is only adaptive when others cooperate as well, as unconditional
cooperation may incur high costs to the individual. We argue that individuals can
use We-if-then plans (collective implementation intentions, cIIs) to regulate their group-
directed behavior strategically, helping them to cooperate selectively with group
members in the situation planned for. In line with this prediction, a cII to consider group
earnings increased cooperative decisions in a prisoners’ dilemma game when playing
against another group member but not when playing against a stranger (i.e., non-group
member). Moreover, cIIs to cooperate in the prisoners’ dilemma game did not increase
cooperation in a structurally similar investment game that participants had not planned
for. We discuss the role of collective planning in solving social dilemmas.
Keywords: collective implementation intentions, small group performance, self-regulation, cooperation,
prisoners’ dilemma, motivation science
INTRODUCTION
“Aside from the moral issue, a man who does not show backbone acts unwisely. He invites the bestiality of
the mob which is always ready to have its brutal fun but is afraid to stick out its neck when it knows that it
will be resisted” (Lewin, 1939/1997).
Teamwork implies cooperation; groups imply the pursuit of social goals; the collective good
requires individual sacrifice. All these assumptions are common in research and the general public,
indicating that individual cooperation and sacrifice are crucial to ensure group success (Kerr, 1983).
At the same time, unconditional cooperation may leave the individual vulnerable to exploitation.
As Lewin (1939/1997) indicates, strangers may take one’s cooperation for granted and exploit those
who behave too agreeably. Even members of one’s own group may come to realize that they can free
ride on the goodwill and effort of unconditionally cooperative members, thereby minimizing their
own contributions to the group (Kerr, 1983). Because cooperation is beneficial in some contexts
but detrimental in others, conditional cooperation is key to the welfare and performance of groups
and their members.
However, how can groups ensure such conditional cooperation? Existing approaches for
increasing cooperation commonly rely on direct interaction between members, thereby allowing
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members to punish free-riders (e.g., by pursuing a tit-for-tat
strategy). Group contexts may often not afford the necessary
information, as group members only sporadically learn about
others’ decisions or the outcomes achieved by the entire group.
We will argue that group members have to rely on their
capacity to regulate their behavior adaptively. We also suggest
that mere goals are insufficient and that group members will
benefit from planning prospectively when, where, how, and with
whom to cooperate, thereby using their individual self-regulation
capability to steer group processes.
Importance of Conditional Cooperation
in Groups
To perform successfully, groups require the contributions of
their members (Steiner, 1972; Hinsz et al., 1997; Hinsz and
Ladbury, 2012), but group members can often enjoy the benefits
of their group’s performance even if they do not contribute
adequately (Kerr, 1983, 2013; Parks, 2020). When contributing
to a group performance comes at a personal cost, a conflict arises
between the group’s maximal performance and the individual’s
temptation to engage in free-riding. These social dilemmas are
difficult to resolve (Komorita and Parks, 1995; Weber et al., 2004)
because it is tempting to follow selfish interests even when one
has cooperative group goals (Sheldon and Fishbach, 2011). For
instance, even when a team member has the goal to promote a
joint project, it may be tempting to take the afternoon off.
Decisions in prisoners’ dilemma games (PDG) reveal
whether group members maximize their individual or collective
performance because they pose an explicit conflict between
collective and individual outcomes (Dawes, 1980; Weber
et al., 2004; Messick and Brewer, 2005): Two players choose
between two options, and their outcomes depend on each
other’s choices. One of the choices (usually termed defect) leads
to greater individual profit than the choice (usually termed
cooperate), regardless of the other player’s decision. However,
mutual cooperation leads to better joint outcomes than mutual
defection. The collectively rational choice is thus to cooperate.
However, because the choice to defect leads to greater individual
profits, it is tempting for the individual, and deciding in favor
of one’s group (i.e., cooperate) requires self-control (Sheldon
and Fishbach, 2011; Martinsson et al., 2012). Indeed, even when
committed to the collective goal of securing common, long-term
benefits, individuals often act selfishly and in line with their
individual goal (Komorita and Parks, 1995). In short, it is difficult
to prioritize the collective goal over the conflicting individual
goal in social dilemma situations.
This conflict between individual and collective goals is
even stronger in dilemma games with monetary incentives
and when participants do not repeatedly interact (i.e., in one-
shot games). When decision-dependent monetary incentives are
offered, the task poses a real conflict to participants (Smith,
1976), and prioritizing group welfare on the spot becomes even
more difficult than in hypothetical tasks. Similarly, in one-shot
games, a competitor cannot reciprocate cooperation. Reciprocity
(including punishment) is known to increase cooperation in
iterated dilemma games (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Fehr
and Gächter, 2002) and allows for self-interested cooperation
(e.g., favorable self-presentation; Danheiser and Graziano, 1982;
maximizing monetary earnings; Kreps et al., 1982). Thus, as
reciprocity is impossible in one-shot games; defection becomes
the dominant strategy, as it yields greater payoffs for the
individual regardless of the competitor’s choice (Camerer,
2003). Moreover, under anonymous conditions, self-presentation
concerns are unlikely to operate. In sum, anonymous and
incentivized one-shot dilemma games promote the individual
goal to defect and make it difficult to prioritize the collective
goal to cooperate.
Despite the importance of cooperation for group outcomes,
unconditional cooperation is unwise. It is easy for free-
riders to exploit the goodwill of those who always cooperate
(Lewin, 1939), and it is therefore important to carefully choose
whom to cooperate with – and when (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981; Ohtsuki, 2018). Although such conditional cooperation
is crucial, only approximately 50% of people follow this
strategy, and this holds true even when full information on
the other actors is available (Fischbacher et al., 2001). In group
contexts, cooperation decreases considerably between members
of different groups (Reinders Folmer et al., 2012). However, even
within one’s group, one may agree to cooperate on certain tasks
but not on others. Unconditional cooperation may invite free-
riders to exploit the group, and it is thus important to stick to the
cooperation one has agreed upon. However, how can groups put
conditional cooperation into action?
Regulating Goal Striving in Groups With
Collective Implementation Intentions
At this point, one may argue that groups should set strong
cooperative goals (Zander, 1971; Shaw, 1976; Karau and
Williams, 1993) that refer to group outcomes (collective goals;
e.g., “we want to make cooperative decisions;” Weldon and
Weingart, 1993; Locke and Latham, 2006) to ensure group
success. However, analogous to the individual level (Sheeran and
Webb, 2016; Webb and Sheeran, 2006), a strong commitment to
a group goal is not sufficient for group goal attainment (Wieber
et al., 2012, 2013). In line with this reasoning, Seijts and Latham
(2000) noted that “A social dilemma appears to be a boundary
condition for the normally positive effect of group goal setting
on group performance” (p. 104). Group goals are, therefore, not
sufficient to ensure cooperation.
Collective implementation intention (cII) theory proposes
that groups can resort to if–then plans to narrow this
gap between cooperative intentions and cooperative actions
(Thürmer et al., 2015a, 2017, 2020b). At the individual level,
forming implementation intentions (IIs) that specify in advance
when, where, and how to act in an if–then format (e.g.,
“And if I encounter situation y, then I will show the goal-
directed response z!”; Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999, 2014) have been
found to reliably facilitate goal striving and attainment in
academic, health, and interpersonal domains (meta-analyses
by Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006; Adriaanse et al., 2011;
Webb et al., 2012; Bélanger-Gravel et al., 2013; Chen et al.,
2015; Toli et al., 2016; Vilà et al., 2017; Silva et al., 2018;
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McWilliams et al., 2019; meta-analysis of meta-analyses by
Keller et al., 2020). Building on this experimental research,
cII theory proposes that groups can resort to traditional if–
then plans (I–if–then plans) but also to We–if–then plans.
Like individual IIs, such cIIs are if–then plans that specify
when, where, and how to act toward a set goal. Different
from IIs, cIIs refer to the group (e.g., “And if we encounter
situation Y, then we will show response Z!”). A growing body of
empirical evidence indicates that cIIs can indeed promote group
goal attainment.
Initial studies observed cII effects in decision-making tasks,
focusing on the integration of socially and temporally distributed
information. In the first set of studies, a cII to review
information enabled groups to review and integrate socially
distributed information in hidden profile problems, leading to
more informed decisions (Thürmer et al., 2015b). Moreover, a
cII to take an observer’s perspective enabled groups to integrate
emerging information in an escalation of commitment task,
leading to more prudent investment decisions (Wieber et al.,
2015a). These papers indicate that cIIs can promote group goal
striving, much like IIs do at the individual level.
Recent research has started to investigate potential differences
between cIIs and traditional IIs in groups, indicating that cIIs
induce a group-focus (Thürmer et al., 2017). In one study,
three group members jointly performed a physical persistence
task (Bray, 2004) that requires each member’s contribution
(Kerr and Hertel, 2011). After performing a baseline round
of the task, groups either formed a cII or an II or received
respective control instructions (i.e., collective vs. individual goal
intentions). Forming cIIs and IIs both improved performance
in comparison with the respective control groups without an
if–then plan, but these effects seemed to rely on different
processes. Groups that had formed a cII communicated more
with each other than did II groups. Moreover, cII groups
referred more to the group (first-person plural pronouns were
used; cf. Pennebaker et al., 2003), but the II group members
referred more to themselves (first-person singular pronouns were
used). A second experimental study confirmed the causal role
of the group-focus: the cII led to better performance when
participants were encouraged to communicate, and the II led
to better performance when participants were prevented from
communicating. In sum, an increased group focus qualifies as a
process leading to cII effects but not II effects, suggesting that cIIs
should help prioritize group outcomes over individual outcomes
in social dilemmas.
All these existing studies leave open whether cII effects are
specific to one’s group. As outlined earlier, such conditional
effectiveness would be an important precondition for cIIs to
promote group performance safely. At the individual level, if–
then plans heighten the accessibility of the situation specified in
the if-part (Wieber and Sassenberg, 2006). One may therefore
argue that referring to a collective in an if–then plan (i.e.,
forming a cII) heightens the accessibility of “other-related”
concepts (Wong and Hong, 2005; Drouvelis et al., 2015), thereby
increasing cooperation regardless of whether one encounters
someone who is a group member or not. As discussed earlier,
such unconditional cooperation would leave group members
vulnerable to exploitation by strangers and encourage free-riding
of malicious group members.
In contrast, the theory of cIIs predicts that cIIs strategically
increase cooperation, that is, within the group and in the situation
planned for. At the individual level, traditional IIs are dependent
on the goal that they are formed for (Gollwitzer et al., 2008;
Legrand et al., 2017), and cII theory, therefore, assumes that
We–if–then pans support collective goals held by one’s group.
Identification with one’s group is a prerequisite for holding
collective goals (van Knippenberg and Ellemers, 2003), implying
that the group goal to cooperate should only be activated
when facing a group member but not when facing a stranger.
Consequently, a cII to focus on the group outcome should
increase cooperation when facing a group member but not when
facing a stranger, thus being specific to one’s group.
A related open question concerns whether cII effects are
specific to the situation included in the plan. Groups of defectors
take advantage of cooperative members, and it would, therefore,
also be important to cooperate strategically within the group
(Efferson et al., 2016). Such conditional cooperation would
then deter free-riders within the group and ensure good group
performance. One could argue that since cIIs link the group
(included in the situation) to a cooperative response, this link
should lead to unconditional cooperation within the group.
However, IIs at the individual level are known to facilitate only
the preplanned responses (Parks-Stamm et al., 2007; Masicampo
and Baumeister, 2012). Accordingly, We–if–then plans should
facilitate the preplanned response in the specified situation but
not in other situations, even when these other situations are
structurally similar.
PRESENT RESEARCH
Building on prior research on cIIs, the current study investigated
whether We–if–then plans can promote cooperation in social
dilemma situations and whether the expected cII effects
are specific to both (a) one’s group and (b) the preplanned
situation. To test these assumptions, we developed an airline
pricing game (based on Sheldon and Fishbach, 2011) where
group members could choose between cooperation (an
individually unprofitable and collectively profitable choice)
and competition (an individually profitable choice that is
collectively unprofitable). The task thus posed a social dilemma.
Group members either formed a cII to focus on the group
outcome, an II to focus on the individual outcome, or formed a
control if–then plan that referred to neither the group outcome
nor the individual outcome. Participants then played against
alleged other group members and against non-group members.
To preclude the operation of ulterior motives for cooperation
(e.g., favorable self-presentation; Danheiser and Graziano, 1982;
maximizing monetary earnings; Kreps et al., 1982), participants
did not receive feedback on theirs or their partner’s decisions
(i.e., multiple one-shot games), and their identity was completely
anonymous. Lastly, participants played a structurally similar
game that they had not planned for. We expected cIIs to increase
costly cooperation within one’s group but not with non-group
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members and in the situation planned for but not in similar
situations that participants had not planned for.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Design
We collected a convenience sample of 134 University of Konstanz
students (80 female) with a mean age of 20.90 years (SD = 2.58).
Participants received a decision-dependent monetary incentive
(see PDG Task); participants earned 4.51€ on average (SD = 2.20).
The experiment followed a 2 within (Competitor: alliance
member vs. non-alliance member) × 3 between (II: control vs.
II vs. cII) mixed factorial design. Power analyses indicated that
the achieved sample size was sufficient to detect a medium-sized
interaction effect (1 – B = 0.99). We moreover added a 2 between
control factor (Explicitly Assigned Goal: individual vs. collective)
to explore whether an explicit individual or collective goal would
already impact dilemma decisions; the control factor was fully
crossed with the II factor.
Procedure and Manipulation
After giving informed consent, all participants learned that
the study concerned business decision-making and that they
would be paid according to the decisions made: at the end
of the experiment, the decision from one randomly chosen
trial was matched with the decision of another randomly
selected previous participant to determine their decision-payoff.
There was no deception concerning the payoff (for the first
participants, actual decisions from voluntary pre-testers blind to
the hypotheses were used).
Participants all received the individual code name
International Airline and learned that they were part of the
group Flugallianz (see section “Materials”). To test whether
explicitly assigned goals are sufficient to increase cooperation,
half of the participants were asked to set the individual goal “I
want to maximize International Airline’s revenue” during the
instructions for the non-alliance task (see section “Materials”);
the other half of the participants were asked to set the explicit
collective goal “We want to maximize Flugallianz’s revenue”
during the instructions for the alliance task. To make sure that
all participants took equal time to think about the task at hand,
participants who did not receive a respectively assigned goal were
instructed to pay close attention to how both players’ decisions
influence each other.
Before working on the decision trials, participants received a
printed training sheet to manipulate the II factor. Participants
in the cII condition made the collective if–then plan “And when
we are about to make our decision, then we will make sure that
Flugallianz receives the highest payoff!” Participants in the II
condition set the individual if–then plan “And when I am about
to make my decision, then I will make sure that International
Airline receives the highest payoff!” To minimize the differences
between conditions, control participants received the neutral
control plan “When a decision screen appears, then a decision
has to be made.” This plan was also phrased in an if–then format
and referred to making decisions but referred to neither the
individual nor the group.
Eight alliance trials followed (see PDG Task in section
“Materials”). Payoff matrices were used once with each
competitor and presented in a fully randomized order. After a
30-s break, participants worked on eight trials of the no-alliance
task, supposedly against two non-group members (i.e., the non-
alliance members Fly Jet and City Connect). To discourage
cooperation for individual benefit (e.g., maximizing profits with
a tit-for-tat strategy or strategic self-presentation), participants
did not learn about other participants’ decisions until after the
experiment. Cooperation thus mainly benefited the group.
To test whether the expected increases in cooperation through
cIIs spill over to other tasks, participants then played the
hypothetical investment task against a group member (Metropolis
Airways) and a non-group member (Fly Jet). Finally, participants
answered three questionnaires concerning their commitment to
the explicitly set goal (seven items, e.g., “This is a goal to shoot
for,” 1: not at all to 7: completely, Cronbach’s α = 0.70, Klein
et al., 2001), plan commitment (e.g., “I would like to fulfill my
plan,” Cronbach’s α = 0.86), and group identification (e.g., “It is
important to me to belong to my group,” Cronbach’s α = 0.83).
Materials
We developed a PDG task (based on Sheldon and Fishbach, 2011)
that included a group membership to allow for the collective
goal to cooperate. We conducted a pilot study to confirm this
assumption. Lastly, we used an investment task (adapted from
Fischbacher et al., 2001).
Prisoners’ Dilemma Games Task
The task was introduced as an airline pricing game, and
participants learned that they would be paid according to one
of their decisions (see section “Procedure and Manipulation”).
To prevent experimenter demand, the instructions clearly stated
participants were free to decide on either option. It was explained
that participants had to take on different roles (i.e., representing
different airlines) to provide a meaningful competition context.
Actually, all participants assumed the role of the International
Airline CEO and were asked to remember this airline well, as it
was their individual codename for the study and then prompted
to type it (free recall). Participants then learned that they were
to decide on the pricing of their tickets for different routes
of their airline services (adapted from Sheldon and Fishbach,
2011): they could either choose standard pricing (cooperate)
or discount pricing (defect). However, each route was also
serviced by another airline that chose between the two pricing
options, and the outcome of both airlines’ decisions influenced
each other in a PDG fashion. An example payoff-matrix was
provided (see Figure 1A) and explained in detail. Four questions
followed to check whether participants understood the situations
of mutual cooperation, mutual competition, and one player
competing while the other cooperates (e.g., “How much do
you earn when both choose standard pricing?/How much do
you earn when both choose discount pricing?/How much do you
earn when you choose discount pricing and the other airline
chooses standard pricing?/How much do you earn when you
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FIGURE 1 | (A) No-alliance (non-group member) payoff matrix. In this
prisoners’ dilemma task, the regular price (A) can be considered to be the
cooperative decision due to the higher joint payoff (A,a > B,b); the discount
price (B) can be considered to be the defect decision due to the higher
individual payoff (B,a > A,a; B,b > A,b). (B) Alliance payoff matrix. Alliance
payoffs are paid to the players 50/50, and this matrix thus leads to identical
payoffs to the no-alliance matrix. However, alliance payoffs visualize the
difference in joint payoffs according to each combination of decisions.
choose standard pricing and the other airline chooses discount
pricing?”). Participants with wrong answers were prompted
to correct them; if needed, the experimenter reiterated the
instructions. All participants could thus be expected to have
experienced the individual temptation to defect.
Next, the group (alliance) was introduced: International
Airline, Air Oceanea, and Metropolis Airways founded the
Flugallianz to market residual tickets. Participants were informed
that the alliance was important to the task, asked to memorize the
alliance name, and type it (free recall). An example slide with the
alliance’s situation was presented (see Figure 1B) and explained
thoroughly. It was emphasized that the alliance-revenue for
each connection would be divided between the two airlines
servicing the respective route 50/50. When constructing the
payoff matrices, we subtracted equal amounts from each player
to create the alliance payoff. The actual payoff for individual and
alliance trials was thus the same (see “Payoff-Matrices”). Again,
participants had to respond to three questions correctly before
they could continue with the experiment (“How much do you
earn directly when both choose standard pricing? How much
do you receive from the Alliance when both choose standard
pricing? How much do you receive from the Alliance when
both choose discount pricing?”). All participants could thus be
expected to have formed the collective goal to cooperate through
the instructions (see “Pilot Study”).
Payoff-Matrices
We constructed four payoff-matrices: Cooperation-cooperation
payoffs (a, A) ranged from 4 to 7; this difference was deemed
sufficiently small to prevent high-stakes effects (Burton-Chellew
and West, 2012). Differences to the other payoffs were held
constant across payoff-matrices (for the player: B, a +2, A, b −3,
B, b −2) to keep the temptation to defect constant (Smith, 1976).
We constructed Alliance matrices by subtracting equal amounts
from both competitors in the respective field of the payoff
matrix. As the alliance payoffs were divided equally between both
airlines servicing the route (50/50), this left the payoff unchanged.
Moreover, to prevent effects from making the same decision
repeatedly, for each decision, two fictitious three-letter airport
codes (e.g., STB-LMT) indicated a different flight route.
Pilot Study
We ran a pilot study to ensure that the alliance task actually
activated a cooperative group goal. The pilot thus followed
a 2 (Competitor: alliance vs. non-alliance) within the design.
Twelve students from the University of Konstanz (4 female, mean
age = 22.83 years, SD = 2.79) participated in return for decision-
contingent payment (see “Procedure and Manipulation”) and
earned 3.29€ on average (SD = 0.95). After playing the PDG task
(see PDG Task), participants responded to seven items designed
to measure group identification (see earlier discussion, Cronbach’s
α = 0.88). On average, participants cooperated less than they
defected (M = 4.17 out of 16 trials, SD = 3.13). This indicates
that the task posed a strong temptation to defect. To test whether
group membership affected participants’ pricing decisions, the
cooperation score was entered into a repeated-measure ANOVA
with Competitor (group member vs. non-group member) as
within-factor. As expected, participants cooperated more when
faced with a group member (M = 2.75 out of 8 trials, SD = 2.30)
than when faced with a non-group member (M = 1.42 out of 8
trials, SD = 1.38), F(1, 11) = 4.63, p = 0.05, part. η2 = 0.30. In
line with this result, participants reported medium identification
with the Flugallianz, M = 4.29, SD = 1.27. Together, the findings
suggest that our alliance task successfully activated the collective
goal to cooperate.
Hypothetical Investment Task
We adapted an investment task from Fischbacher et al. (2001)
as a second task, which poses a conflict between individual and
group outcomes but that participants had not planned for. Each
participant learned that they had $10,000 that could be invested
in a common project account with another player or be kept in
one’s own account. The other player would also have this choice.
Money in one’s own account could be kept. All the contributions
to the common project account would be added, and each airline
would receive 75% of the total amount. Participants indicated
in steps of $1,000 how much of their $10,000 they would
like to transfer to the project account (i.e., $0, $1,000, $2,000,
and so forth). Investing was thus a good opportunity to make
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money if both airlines contributed but required trusting the other
player to contribute equally. Importantly, although this game is
structurally equivalent to the dilemma game played in the main
experiment, it confronts players with a situation they had not
planned for. It is thus well suited to examine whether the cII led
to generalized or situation-specific cooperation.
Dependent Measures
Dependent measures were the number of cooperative decisions
(i.e., number of trials where standard pricing was chosen) in
alliance and non-alliance trials.
RESULTS
Unless indicated otherwise, we analyzed the data with a
mixed ANOVA with Competitor (group member vs. non-
group member) as a repeated factor and II (control vs. II vs.
cII) and Explicitly Assigned Goal (individual vs. collective) as
between factors.
Manipulation Checks
Participants reported medium group identification, M = 4.57,
SD = 1.06, commitment to their plan, M = 3.56, SD = 0.94,
and commitment to their explicit goal, M = 4.86, SD = 0.74.
Importantly, goal commitment did not differ between the
explicit individual and the explicit collective goal condition, F(2,
128) = 1.07, p = .30, part. η2 < 0.01. This suggests that the
current task allows for holding both individual and collective
goals. Unexpectedly, participants with the control intention
(unrelated, neutral if–then plan) reported more commitment to
their assigned individual or collective goal than participants in
the II and the cII conditions, F(2, 128) = 3.21, p = .04, part.
η2 = 0.05. However, including goal commitment as a covariate
did not change the results reported. No other main or interaction
effects were observed for any of the control variables, Fs < 2,
ps > 0.15.
Main Analyses
Our first prediction stated that cII effects on cooperation are
limited to members of one’s group. To investigate whether cIIs
can help group members to keep their individual temptations
in check, we analyzed the number of cooperative choices. We
argued that cIIs support collective goal striving and thus should
only increase cooperation when facing a group member. In line
FIGURE 2 | Number of cooperative decisions in the prisoners’ dilemma task
by cII condition and competitor. Error bars represent standard errors.
with this reasoning, the expected Competitor × II interaction
was significant, F(2, 128) = 9.60, p < .01, part. η2 = 0.13: when
competing against a group member, cIIs led to more cooperation,
M = 4.80, SD = 2.67 (out of eight trials, Figure 2), than both
IIs, M = 2.48, SD = 2.26, p < .01, and control instructions,
M = 2.33, SD = 2.33, p < .01. As expected, there was no
difference between conditions when competing against a non-
group member, Mcontrol = 1.86, SD = 1.95, MII = 2.35, SD = 2.29,
McII = 2.60, SD = 2.63, ps > .14. Thus, the cII did not blindly
support cooperation but only when it served one’s group goal.
One might argue that a cooperative goal is sufficient to
overcome a detrimental individual goal. However, neither a main
effect of Explicitly Assigned Goal, F(2, 128) = 0.23, p = .64, nor a
Competitor × Explicitly Assigned Goal interaction was observed,
F(2, 128) = 2.64, p = .11 (see Table 1, for means and standard
deviations). Accordingly, set goals to act in the interest of the
group did not prevent selfish decisions; achieving cooperation
required collective if–then plans.
As the II factor and the Explicitly Assigned Goal factor were
crossed, we were also able to explore the effectiveness of cIIs when
facing assigned antagonistic goals. The reported Competitor × II
interaction was not qualified by a Competitor × II × Explicitly
Assigned Goal interaction, F(2, 128) = 0.06, p = .94. Apparently,
the cII was even effective in dealing with an assigned antagonistic
individual goal. This observation is in line with (Sheeran et al.,
2005, Study 2) finding that primed goals furnished with IIs are
even attained in the face of assigned antagonistic goals.
TABLE 1 | Cooperation with group members and strangers by implementation intention and explicit goal.
Explicit goal
Individual Collective
Measure Control II cII Control II cII
Mean number of cooperative decisions with group members (out of 8) 2.09 (2.14) 2.48 (2.25) 4.27 (2.81) 2.57 (2.36) 2.48 (2.31) 5.30 (2.48)
Mean number of cooperative decisions with non-group members (out of 8) 1.91 (2.09) 2.78 (2.15) 2.36 (2.50) 1.81 (1.83) 1.91 (2.39) 2.83 (2.79)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Our second prediction stated that cII effects on cooperation
are limited to the critical situation specified in the plan. Although
cIIs do not lead to general cooperation with people outside of
one’s group, they might lead to cooperation in general within
one’s group; in other words, their enactment might not depend
on the specified situation. General cooperation within one’s
group should then spillover, for instance, to the investment task
participants played at the end of the experiment. In contrast,
we predicted that cII effects would be specific to the situation
included in the plan. Analyzing the amount invested in this
second game showed that participants generally invested more
into a project with a group member, M = 6.74 (out of 10),
SD = 2.82, than with a non-group member, M = 5.84, SD = 3.37,
F(2, 127) = 13.47, p = .01, part. η2 = 0.09 (one participant
failed to complete this task and was consequently excluded
from this analysis). However, neither a main effect of II, F(2,
127) = 0.47, p = .63, nor an II × Competitor interaction emerged,
F(2, 127) = 1.63, p = .20. This indicates that the cII did not
generally increase participants’ cooperation, not even with group
members; instead, cIIs specifically increased cooperation in the
situation planned for.
In sum, the cII helped to resist an individual temptation
for the sake of one’s group, even if this individual temptation
was supported by an explicitly set goal. However, the cII did
not increase cooperation when the collective goal was not
activated (i.e., when facing non-group members) or in another
situation not specified in the if-part of the plan (i.e., in an
unrelated investment task). This pattern of results suggests that
cIIs selectively support the collective goal they are formed for,
even when this collective goal conflicts with the individual’s
selfish goals. However, the group context planned for and the
situation specified in the if-part of a cII need to be in place; these
prerequisites thus qualify as moderators of cII effects.
DISCUSSION
Group performance and human success depend on cooperation.
At the same time, unconditional cooperation leaves group
members vulnerable to exploitation, may encourage others to
take a free ride, and ultimately diminish group outcomes.
We argued that group goals are insufficient to increase such
conditional cooperation when the collective goals and the
individual goals are in conflict (i.e., in a social dilemma situation)
and that groups need We–if–then plans (cIIs; cIIs). Indeed, cIIs
increased cooperation with group members in a PDG. Decisions
were anonymous and incentivized, providing participants with
the opportunity and incentives to defect. Cooperation was thus
costly to the individual but highly beneficial to the group. In line
with our predictions, we observed that cIIs induced conditional
cooperation, that is, cooperation specific to (a) one’s group and
(b) the situation planned for. Such conditional cooperation can
be expected to maximize group performance in the long run.
These findings are key to the theory of cIIs. Conditional
cooperation is crucial to ensure the effective functioning
of groups, and cIIs promote such adaptive group behavior.
Regarding the processes underlying cII effects, the current
research indicates that the group context and the situation
specified qualify as moderators. We–if–then plans thus do not
turn group members into “collectivist robots” but promote
adaptive and intentional group cooperation.
Implications for Cooperation in Groups
We investigated cooperation in the context of a social dilemma
with considerable incentives for individuals to defect. In line
with past research (Locke and Latham, 2006), goals were
not sufficient to ensure cooperation in this situation; instead,
collective if–then plans were needed. Importantly, these plans
increased cooperation selectively, thus not making the individual
group member vulnerable to exploitation. This indicates that
cIIs to cooperate are safe to apply in group settings, at least
when formulated diligently (i.e., specifying one’s group and the
prospective situation).
One may argue that cooperation will not always be the key to
group success in dilemma situations. In fact, market structures
may ensure that competition also yields beneficial collective
outcomes (Maciejovsky and Budescu, 2007, 2013). Contrary to
these findings, a recent study observed that competition and
cooperation both increased effort early on during team tenure,
but only cooperation had a positive effect later on (Hertel et al.,
2018). Cooperative and competitive processes may thus lead to
beneficial group outcomes. Support for this line of reasoning
comes from classic research showing that purely individual
motives, such as earning money in repeated interactions (Kreps
et al., 1982) or gaining reputation where decisions are public
(Danheiser and Graziano, 1982), may drive cooperation. Given
that if–then planning is effective at the individual level and at the
group level, it would be interesting to explore how plans across
social levels can promote these different processes.
Teams perform many important tasks in organizations, and
cooperation is key to team performance (Van Lange et al.,
2013). Increasing cooperation by forming cIIs could thus be
highly beneficial in work contexts (Thürmer et al., 2015a;
Gagné, 2018). Although limited data is available on this question
(Lehmann et al., 2019), research on social dilemmas and social
loafing has proven highly influential in organizational teams
(Stouten and Liden, 2020), and II effects have been observed
in organizational contexts, such as adherence to new workplace
regulations (Holland et al., 2006) and making entrepreneurial
decisions (Adam and Fayolle, 2015; van Gelderen et al., 2017).
It is, therefore, likely that cII effects on cooperation generalize to
organizational settings (Thürmer et al., 2015a).
Implications for Collective Action Control
The present research informs classic and current debates on how
groups attain their goals. First, our research provides an empirical
demonstration that committing to group goals may indeed
be insufficient to ensure positive group outcomes (collective
intention-behavior gap; Wieber et al., 2012, 2013). Although
adopting explicit individual or collective goals had no effect
on cooperation in our experiment, if–then plans significantly
increased rates of goal attainment. This observation is in line with
classic individual-level research (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999, 2014)
and recent group-level advances (Thürmer et al., 2015a, 2020b).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 November 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 561388
fpsyg-11-561388 November 20, 2020 Time: 14:29 # 8
Thürmer et al. Planning Conditional Cooperation
In contrast to cIIs, IIs had no effects on cooperation. However, the
IIs used in the current research focused on individual outcomes
instead of group outcomes. Building on group-level goal setting
research (Kleingeld et al., 2011), the pertinent next step would
be to investigate whether and how classic IIs focusing on group
outcomes can increase conditional cooperation.
Regarding the processes underlying cII effects, the present
research highlights two important moderators. The specified
situation emerged as a well-known moderator of if–then
planning effects (Parks-Stamm et al., 2007); additionally, group
membership emerged as a unique moderator of cII effects.
This finding is in line with the goal-dependency of if–then
plan effects (Sheeran et al., 2005), as group membership
is a prerequisite for the commitment to group goals (van
Knippenberg and Ellemers, 2003). Recent research moreover
indicates that cIIs are particularly effective when using an if–then
format (Thürmer et al., 2020a). Understanding these processes
underlying cII effects will help maximize their effects across
settings (Gollwitzer et al., 2010).
Finally, our research indicates that collective if–then plans
help individuals overcome the temptation to follow their
immediate self-interest. Future research should investigate
whether a cooperative personality qualifies as a moderator
of this effect. There is a substantial interindividual variation
in whether people choose to cooperate (Parks, 2015, 2020),
and these differences may have a key impact on teamwork
(Graziano et al., 1997). Individual-level research indicates that
if–then planning can protect people from acting on their
unwanted personality traits (Hudson and Fraley, 2015). Moving
toward a full situational analysis (Kelley and Thibaut, 1978;
Kelley et al., 2003), exploring the interplay between personality
and We–if–then planning is a highly fruitful direction for
future research.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are three limitations of the present research that warrant
discussion. First, one may argue that gains in collective
performance were relatively easy to achieve in the current
task, as cooperation rates were generally quite low. However,
cII effects have already been observed under conditions where
collective effort is high (Thürmer et al., 2017) and in tasks
with incentivized group performance (Thürmer et al., 2015b).
It is thus unlikely that cIIs only improve group performance
when groups perform poorly. Related to this, group interaction
in the present study was delayed, such that there was no
opportunity for reciprocity or face-to-face interaction. Both
reciprocity and face-to-face interaction have a great impact
on behavior in groups, leading to the question whether cIIs
would also increase cooperation in such interactive settings.
However, cII effects have already been demonstrated in face-
to-face interactions (e.g., Thürmer et al., 2015b, 2017; Wieber
et al., 2015a), indicating that cIIs could increase cooperation in
interactive settings.
Second, one may argue that the present study used but one
type of task and that task type is a crucial (yet often neglected)
moderator in group research (Kerr, 2017). Past research has,
however, observed cII effects in a wide range of tasks (Thürmer
et al., 2020b). Still, a remaining question in this regard is
which neural processes are underlying cII effects. Past research
has illuminated the physiological processes underlying if–then
planning in individuals (Wieber et al., 2015b; Wolff et al., 2018)
and spontaneous action planning at the dyadic level (Kourtis
et al., 2019). Combining both streams of research, ideally using
neurological measures during performance tasks (Wolff et al.,
2019), would help to understand further cII effects and their
processes at the group level.
Third, we only investigated an intragroup setting and did
not specify the group membership of non-group members.
Intergroup settings may pose particular hindrances to successful
self-regulation, such as the experience of negative emotions
(Niedenthal and Brauer, 2012) or the ascription of negative
intentions (Hornsey and Esposo, 2009), leading to costly
defensive responses (Thürmer and McCrea, 2018, in-principal
acceptance; Thürmer et al., 2019). These responses are hard
to change in intergroup contexts. One promising exception
is the use of compelling narratives that describe the flow
of actions in context and thereby help focus on a new
reality (Murrar and Brauer, 2019). IIs can help change
the expression of negative stereotypes (Stewart and Payne,
2008; Mendoza et al., 2010), and our research suggests
that We–if–then planning may help change (collectively)
costly behavior. Future research should thus test whether
combining convincing narratives with cIIs helps further reduce
intergroup animosities.
CONCLUSION
Cooperation ensures group success, but it also leaves people
vulnerable to exploitation. The present research demonstrates
that cIIs can help solve this dilemma. People with We–if–then
plans cooperate when cooperation is called for, with the right
people and in the right situation.
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